ปัจจัยความสำเร็จในการเจรจายุติปัญหาพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์มลายา (พคม.) ในประเทศไทย

Oracha Rakdee

Authors

Oracha Rakdee Faculty of Political Science, Prince of Songkla University

Keywords:

Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), Hat Yai Peace Accord, Success Factors

Abstract

This research article aims to examine the success factors in the peace negotiation process to end the armed struggle of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in Thailand, which led to the signing of the Hat Yai Peace Accord on December 2, 1989. The study employs qualitative research methodology using document analysis of primary sources from the CPM, the Thai government, and the Malaysian government, as well as secondary sources, non-participant observation, and in-depth interviews with two key informant groups: former CPM members in Thailand and Malaysia, and Thai and Malaysian government officials involved in the negotiation process, totaling 21 participants. The collected data were analyzed using content analysis.

The findings reveal that the factors driving the success of the negotiation can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of four external or international factors: 1. the peaceful environment and the Cold War détente; 2. the Sino-Soviet Split and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict; 3. China's policy transformation under Deng Xiaoping; and 4. Malaysia's proactive diplomacy in establishing a Quid Pro Quo arrangement with China. The second category consists of four domestic factors within Thailand: 1. the political will of leaders to pursue negotiation; 2. the success of rapport and trust-building; 3. mutually acceptable and honorable negotiation conditions for all parties; and 4. strategic stalemate. These factors converged to create the conditions of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate as conceptualized in Zartman's Ripeness Theory, producing the ripe moment that ultimately led to the negotiation and the achievement of the peace accord.

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